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Abstract
The essay focuses on the figure of the «lector philosophus», to
whom the Tractatus theologico-politicus is explicitly addressed: not
the contemplative and isolated wise man, nor the philosophers of
the future, with whom one can engage in an esoteric debate on truths
that are disguised and muffled between the text lines, but a varied
cultural and social class abundantly present in the Netherlands at
the time. An aristocracy of the mind (open to rational research,
against dogmatism), of the economy (free market, against the
monopoly of large commercial companies), and of religion (tolerant
and libertarian minority cults). It is a plurality of individuals that
have to be educated to the definitive liberation from all theological
prejudice, on the basis of that deistic «fides universalis» which
Spinoza’s biblical exegesis outlines in the first fifteen chapters of the
treatise: a theology open to reason and intended to support, at the
political level, the democratic-republican faction against the
repressive authoritarianism of monarchy and official cults. On the
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other hand, the grand political and pedagogical design of the
treatise preventively excludes the «vulgus», whose ignorance and
superstitions irremediably put them in the hands of the Calvinist
church and of the Orange family. However, the design of a democracy
without «vulgus» will soon prove to be doomed to failure.
Keywords: Spinoza, democracy, theology, political philosophy, moral
philosophy.
Resumen
El ensayo se enfoca en la figura del «lector philosophus», a quien
está explícitamente dirigido el Tractatus theologico-politicus; no el sabio
contemplativo y aislado, ni los filósofos del futuro, con quienes se
puede entablar un debate esotérico sobre verdades ocultas y veladas
entrelíneas, sino una clase cultural y social variada presente
abundantemente en la Holanda de entonces. Una aristocracia de la
mente (abierta a la investigación racional, en contra del dogmatismo)
de la economía (mercado libre, en contra del monopolio de las
grandes compañías comerciales), y de la religión (cultos minoritarios
tolerantes y libertarios). Son una pluralidad de individuos que tienen
que ser educados para la liberación definitiva de todo prejuicio
teológico, en base a esa deística «fides universalis» que la exégesis
bíblica de Spinoza recalca en los primeros quince capítulos del
tratado: una teología abierta a la razón y con la intención de apoyar,
en términos políticos, la facción democrática-republicana contra el
autoritarismo represivo de la monarquía y de los cultos oficiales.
Por otra parte, el gran diseño político y pedagógico del tratado
excluye de modo preventivo el «vulgus», cuya ignorancia y
supersticiones los deja irremediablemente de la mano de la iglesia
calvinista y de la familia Orange. Sin embargo, el diseño de una
democracia sin «vulgus» resultará prontamente destinado al fracaso.
Palabras clave: Spinoza, democracia, teología, filosofía política,
filosofía moral.
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In response to Oldenburg, who asked to be informed of the «consilium
et scopum»1 of the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza adduces
three reasons from which the tangle of science and militancy, and of theory
and contingency, emerges as the backbone of all his work with an effective
and synthetic epistolary style. First of all, the prejudices of theologists,
the greatest obstacle that men encounter along the path of philosophical
research, encourage him to compose a «tractatum» on his method of
interpreting sacred texts («de meo circa scripturam sensu»): we must
«patefacere» said «praejudicia» and remove them «a mentibus
prudentiorum». Secondly, he feels the need to «averruncare», as much
as possible, the «opinio» of the «vulgus», which persist in depicting him
as an atheist. And finally, the book aims to defend «omnibus modis» the
«libertas philosophandi dicendique quae sentimus», a faculty which is
constantly attacked and threatened by the excessive authority of
«preachers».2 The subtitle of the treatise, which announces «dissertationes»
aimed at demonstrating that «freedom to philosophize may not only be
allowed without danger to piety and the stability of the republic but cannot
be refused without destroying the peace of the republic and piety itself»3,
directly refers to the purely political quality of said «libertas», namely to
the fact that it is necessarily and directly related to the nature of the
«respublica». The style of the Praefatio, emblematic in its content, and
even more so in its tone and intense register, immediately makes it clear
that this is not a mere philosophical speculation. In a passionate and
argumentative way, far from the detached pace and the «cold quietness
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1 EP XXIX (G4, p. 165). For the initials and abbreviations used, refer to the bibliographical
note.
2 EP XXX, to Oldenburg (G4, p. 166).
3 TTP, p. 1 (G3, p. 4).
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of mathematical reasoning»4 that characterize the Ethics, Spinoza
denounces the civil damage of «superstitio» and the perverse theological-
political link that feeds it solely to instil in people’s minds the passivity and
submission that hold together the power of authoritarian hierarchies. Such
a combination helps the annihilating hallucinations of the «regimen
monarchicum», enervating the rational and propelling strength of the
«respublica libera».
1.  The «philosophical reader»
Who are the recipients of the TTP? Right from the Preface the
suggestion appears clear and critical:
These are the topics, philosophical reader, that I here offer
for your examination. I trust they will not be unwelcome given
the importance and usefulness of the subject matter both of
the work as a whole and of each chapter. […] As for others,
I am not particularly eager to recommend this treatise to them,
for I have no reason to expect that it could please them in
any way.
The author knows well «how obstinately those prejudices stick in the
mind that the heart has embraced in the form of piety». He knows equally
well «that it is as impossible to rid the common people of superstition as
it is to rid them of fear»; and finally, he knows that «the constancy of the
common people is obstinacy, and that they are not governed by reason
but swayed by impulse». Thus: «I do not therefore invite the common
people and those who are afflicted with the same feelings as they are, to
read these things»: «theologians», arrogant clerics who do not tolerate
official dogmatic cults (of the Calvinist church but also of the Synagogues).
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The book clearly selects its interlocutors, choosing and discarding them
beforehand, solely addressing since the start the others, the
«reliqui» who
would philosophize more freely were they able to surmount
the obstacle of believing that reason should be subordinate to
theology. I am confident that for this latter group of people
this work will prove extremely useful.5
At the conceptual level, the dilemma of democracy versus tyranny
lies on the polarity between reason and passion, which in turn presents
itself as a real anthropological opposition wherein the «philosopher»
and the «common people» face one another.
On the one hand, the «vulgus»: «rudis»6, who desire unusual and
different things7, ready to feed themselves with prejudices and
preconceptions8, only able to express themselves through «opiniones»
and «modos imaginandi»9; fickle and inconstant («varius et incostans»)10,
always «miserum», never in peace and yearning for everything that is
new and has not yet disappointed them: an instability that often caused
riots and atrocious wars.11 Exposed to the forays of demagogues and
schismatics12, the common people have to be controlled, as far as
possible, like a horse with a bridle, promising those who abide by the
laws the things that they most desire and threatening those who violate
them with what they most fear.13 The TTP addresses the «vulgus» with a
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5 TTP, Praef., p. 12 (G3, p. 12).
6 TTP, XIII (G3, p. 158).
7 TTP, I (G3, p. 15).
8 TTP, XV (G3, p. 180).
9 EP XXX, to Oldenburg (G4, p. 166); Eth I, app.
10 Eth IV, pr. 58 schol.; TTP, XIV (G3, p. 173).
11 TTP, Praef. (G3, p. 6).
12 Eth III, pr. 29 schol.; TTP, XX (G3, pp. 243-245).
13 TTP, IV (G3, p. 59).
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derogatory tone and content, a negative emphasis which finds in erudite
libertinism its closest reference, albeit within the context of a long tradition,
able to permeate a large part of  Western culture: at least from the recurring
attack against the ignorance and incompleteness of the «multitude» (the
«plethos»). The word «vulgus» does not indicate an economic condition
(a modern class) or a legal «status» (a pre-modern class), but a mental
and cultural habit, a sociological area, that generally does not necessarily
correspond to the lowest strata of society, and nevertheless always has a
strong negative connotation; a category of people who share inadequate
or false knowledge, as well as a behaviour driven by passions that leads
to a silent addiction, or to disrupting turmoil, to chaotic and degenerative
conflicts. With these features they are very similar to the «plebs», as it is
depicted in the TTP: «maxima pars» of mankind, inept «rebus sublimibus
percipiendis», they are mentally and intellectually fragile, oppose principled
and virtuous people, are not able to keep silent nor can they refrain from
judgment (however, at least in this instance they can be associated with
the «peritissimi»).14 Political power takes advantage of their superstition
and fear, and when it indulges them –when it listens to the insanity of its
«ire», fighting opinions and oppressing free spirits– lacerations and
devastating conflicts arise.15 «Religio» remains the most effective means
to govern and control them: in a positive way –as it happens to the
Hebrews with Scripture– when it stimulates their devotion and manages
to contain it, through faith, within the limits of virtue16; in a negative way,
when priests supplant kings and religious power shatters political power:
a nefarious role at which the Roman Church has always excelled, second
only to Mohammedanism in deceiving the plebs.17 The «vulgus» cannot
be redeemed nor can they be educated.
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14 TTP, V (G3, p. 69); EP XIX, to Blyenberg (G4, p. 92); TTP, IX, XVIII, XX (G3,
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15 TTP, XVIII and XX (G3, pp. 225-226, 240, 230).
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On the one hand, the «vulgus» (or «plebs»). On the other, the «lector
philosophus». But who is exactly the sole addressee of the TTP? Not the
accomplished, so to say, man of wisdom, the sage, he who needs no
myths and religions because he «knows», and follows a right rule of life
by the natural light of reason18: undoubtedly «blessed», more blessed
than the multitude, for in addition to having real opinions, he also possesses
a clear and distinct conception thereof. This philosopher lies behind the
treatise: he is the one who composes it, not its recipient; he is the
philosophical writer, not the «philosophical reader». Nor does the TTP
address the philosophers of the next centuries: it does not address the
future «men of reasoning» who, reading «between the lines», will be
secretly able to entertain a discussion across time with the person who
wrote it. The only esoteric feature of the TTP is the mild anonymity of its
author.19 The «philosophical reader», a cultured and naturally rational
and libertarian man, has to be liberated from the submission to the truths
of faith he still ascribes to free thought. Involved in politics and economics,
it is not a single individual, but rather a minority and yet important and
significant group present in the Netherlands at the time.
2.  A difficult transition
In the paroxysm of premodern and seventeenth-century Europe, it is
very difficult to engage in metaphysics and theology without getting
involved in the theoretical and practical dynamics of politics. The «free
Dutch Republic» of the time, the powerful Netherlands of the «Golden
Age», is no exception, as witnessed by the religious and state twists that
characterize the two large opposing factions that throughout the
seventeenth century enliven the country and find in their two main
institutional figures their most significant and emblematic focal point: the
«stathouder», prerogative of the House of Orange, halfway between
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18 TTP, V (G3, pp. 76-77).
19 On the TTP as an essay to be read in an esoteric way, naturally I think of Strauss
1948. On Strauss’ reading of Spinoza cf. Caporali 2003.
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monarch and head of the army, and the «representative»
(«raadpensionaris») of the province of Holland, by far the strongest and
most influential among the States-General of the Netherlands.20 The
monarchist-Orangist faction –which prevailed until 1650, when William
II suddenly died at the age of twenty-five, followed by a weak reign–
largely owes its influence to the support of the Calvinist church and can
also count on the rabbis’ consensus. Its political aspirations for royal
absolutism and for a centralised state are as one with the religious
opposition to freedom of thought, to the Roman Catholic Church (the
only one forbidden from publicly professing its faith) and to the proliferation
of Christian denominations. The call to fight for independence from Spain,
and more in general, the aggressive and belligerent behaviour of the
monarchy, are absolutely complementary to traditional anti-papal
resentment. At the economic and political level, the wide support for
monopolies soon finds resonance in the numerous interests of the Jewish
community (and of the Dutch Reformed Church) in the Dutch India
Company. Thus, the monarchist party can count on the support of the
army, of monopolistic interests, of the most powerful religious organizations,
and of a large part of the population that empathizes with the crown for
reasons of faith and social opposition to the middle class, the merchant
bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the republican faction is characterized
by a politics of containment and peace on the international scene, as well
as by a commitment for a more decentralised organization of the State,
and by an unwavering support for liberal economy able to break a
concentration which is way too rigid and invasive. Led by Jan De Witt,
who was for 20 years «raadpensionaris» of Holland, and along with it
arbitrator of the political life of the entire country, republicans enjoyed
the support of the liberal bourgeoisie –which, especially in the most
powerful province, appears as a rich, educated and enlightened
aristocracy– also awakening the interest and attention of several minority
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20 On the history of the Netherlands in the 17th century, Geyl 1951a, 1951b, 1964, and
Huizinga 1941 are fundamental. On the institutional uncertainty in the Netherlands during
the 17th century, see Wilson 1968; Cf. also Droetto 1958. As for the political and cultural
context of the TTP, cf. Nadler 2011.
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cults, whose moving forces often are influential representatives of that
same bourgeoisie: Arminianists (Remostrants), Mennonites, Socinians and
above all Collegiants, the most significant group in Holland in the mid-
seventeenth century: «chrétiens sans église», who live in the shadow of
the policy of tolerance basically practiced by republican authorities, but
openly opposed and fought against by more structured and organized
cults, either for their mysticism or for their rationalism, but in any case for
their rejection of any ecclesiastical hierarchy in the name of natural religion
and freedom of thought.21 These are the plausible «philosophical readers»
that the treatise addresses. Such a historical context is fundamental to
understand the reason behind the TTP. Around 1665 Spinoza interrupts
the Ethics and for the first time starts working on something that focuses
directly on the political, cultural and religious confrontation going on in his
country. The secluded philosopher, the apparently introverted and
detached man of wisdom, exposes himself to the violent attack of
theologians and politicians, with his shocking thesis on God, the Bible
and democracy: on the impersonal and -non-subjective character of divine
nature, lacking intellect and will – or, rather, free from the constraining
angst of «intellectus» and «voluntas»; on Scripture as a work of emotions
and overactive imagination, able to create helpful truths of faith but alien
to any real truth of reason; on the «imperium democraticum» as the most
complete solution to political problems; and on the mutual connections
between that theological interpretation and this political proposal. The
fact that the sage stays anonymous is not enough to place who wrote the
essay within the aseptic framework of the isolated philosopher, alien to
the passions and interests of his own time. It was not difficult in fact to
predict that the author would be easily identified and violently berated, as
it immediately happened; and, above all, the weak cover of anonymity
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21To mention just a few yet fundamental bibliographical references: as for the connections
between theoretical processing and political and religious conflicts, as well as for the general
historical reconstructions already cited, Solari 1974a is a very important read; for a general
overview of the social situation at the time, cf. also Dunin-Borkowski 1933-1936 (in
particular the third volume); On cults, Kolakowski 1969 is definitely a fundamental reference;
on De Witt cf. at least Rowen 1978.
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does not in any way explain why such a dangerous work is composed
and published.22 The physiognomy of the TTP becomes more definite if
we think that during the years 1665-1670 the confrontation between
Orangists and republicans is even more fierce, that the supremacy of the
latter quickly crumbles under the pressure of the new conflicts with England
and France, until the resignation and following assassination of  De Witt,
a crime that in 1672 brings an end to republican hegemony; and that such
confrontation also unfolds on the theoretical level, with an exponential
growth of volumes, articles, and «pamphlets» aimed at restating or
reforming –when not at revolutionising– the relationship between reason
and faith, religion and power, religious creeds and citizenship rights
precisely in this crucial stage for the life of the country.23 The intertwining
of political emergencies and cultural assumptions, the mediations between
political project and speculative analysis, give this work an indirect appeal
that makes it unique among Spinoza’s essays. Such a project also has a
powerful pedagogical value, as a form of education to civil life.
3.  Philosophy and theology
«Separandam Philosophia a Theologia», «fidem a Philosophia
separare»: this is the announced «scopum», the «totius operis praecipuum
intentum».24 In fact, as we immediately perceive, such disarticulation does
not imply any absolute equidistance, nor an authentic and mutual
independence. The separation between philosophy and faith openly
RICCARDO CAPORALI
22 After all, Spinoza himself claims authorship of the treatise in at least two letters:
cf. EPP XLVI, to Leibniz (1671), and XLVIII, to Oldenburg (1675): G4, pp. 234 e 299.
23 A political reading of the relationship between Spinoza and the De Witt brothers
–the oldest testimony of said relation can be found in Lucas 1719– is the one by Gebhardt
1908, who was among the first to see the active dimension of the TTP. Gebhardt’s theses
have been reiterated, among others, by Jaspers 1986, (pp. 8ss. e passim); while Francès
1937 opposed them, calling into question the historical reliability of Spinoza’s involvement
with the De Witt brothers. The most important book on the TTP as a political project
aimed at building a republican «historical bloc» (the author uses Gramsci’s concept quite
intentionally) is the one by Tosel, 1984.
24TTP, II and XIV (G3, pp. 44 and 174).
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pursue, first and foremost, the theoretical and historical objective of the
definitive liberation of «ratio» and «imperium» from any theological
foundations or religious patronage. The way in which the treatise actively
seeks this perspective outlines a dual and significant supremacy of reason:
from the methodological viewpoint, from the side of a hermeneutical
processing that is soon tuned on the frequency modulations of the «lumen
naturae»; and from its final outcome, by virtue of which the separation of
the traditional authoritative connection between theology and politics ends
up quietening down in the cradle of a new aggregation, this time with a
reverse hegemony and a mostly rational nature. It is a regrouping that
seems to add little to the theory, and rather focuses on the risks and
possibilities of practice, the anxieties and opportunities of the historical
time. Essential elements in pursuance of the announced «intentio» are a
new doctrine of revelation («de prophetia») and «de Interpretatione
Scripturae», outlined in four chapters –chapter one, two, seven and
fifteen–, that appear as the real architrave of the entire Spinozian exegesis,
and of the first part of the book, while the others clearly have a
complementary or subordinate function, serving as example and support.
All men are ready to say that Holy Scripture is the word of
God that teaches us true happiness or the way of salvation,
but their actions betray a quite different opinion25:
as a matter of fact, the «vulgus» does not care about living according
to Scripture teachings at all and theologians do nothing more than extort
their own «figmenta & placita» from it, only worrying about forcing other
people «to agree with them» in the name of religion. Adding superstition,
which «teaches people to despise reason, and nature, and revere and
venerate only such things as conflict with these both» –, the outcome is
that the spirit of «religio» no longer consists in charity but «under the false
labels of holy devotion and ardent zeal, into the promotion of conflict and
dissemination of senseless hatred».26 To leave «ab his turbis» and free
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the mind from theological prejudices, it is first of all necessary to define a
new «methodus interpretandi», in order to know with certainty what
Scripture really teaches. Therefore:
I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture, does not differ
from the method of interpreting nature, but rather is wholly
consonant with it.27
Once inspiration is no longer apologetically accepted as a starting
point, Scripture appears open to investigation, a field for critical research
with no pre-established borders, but those of its own reliability. However,
the reliability of research is no different than the reliability of reason:
Scripture cannot be preliminarily accepted as a «legitimate» source,
because in so doing the divine «auctoritas» would always and inevitably
end up changing into too many and opposed human authorities. Therefore,
it has to be adopted as a «text» to be studied, assessed and plumbed,
like «nature», which is the ultimate field of rational investigation. From the
methodological viewpoint, it is the first primacy of «ratio» that invites,
first of all, to stay on topic, to adhere to the field of investigation: «Scriptura
secundum Scripturam», «cognitio Scripturae ab eadem sola».28 Essentially,
approaching the Bible as «opus» means inspecting it, first and foremost,
in terms of style, language, literary genre, and the vicissitudes it experienced
over time.29 The «lector philosophus» has to be educated to a new reading
of the sacred text, not because he must abandon his faith –the same faith
of which Spinoza’s essay feels no need–, but rather to be able to critically
scrutinize its actual authors, doctrinal contents and political practices.
The paths of this critical examination –which naturally cannot be
resumed here in an analytical way– produce completely subversive results
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Biedermann 1903, Bonifas 1904, Zac 1965, Breton 1977, Moreau 1988 and 1991, Mignini
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of consolidated dogmatic religions and their authoritative political
projections. Starting from the prophetic revelation, which is attributed to
«imaginatio» –the first kind of knowledge according to Spinoza–, and is
by its own nature prone to error, and to its political function to achieve
obedience. Such was the nature of the prophecy of  Moses, intended to
rebuild the Jewish state after its liberation from slavery. That was the
most powerful prophecy, but not the only one, since each people had
their own prophets and each people felt in their own way «chosen» by
God, by their own god. That which in Spinoza’s essay is the awareness
that men, as «modus», modifications of Nature, are a more or less
powerful expressions of it, in terms of prophetic imaginations becomes
the idea of a text, of an order directly dictated by a personal and almighty
God, with regal features, that appreciates and dislikes, chooses and
rejects, rewards and condemns. Thus, the «certitudo prophetica» is not
of a deductive and rational kind but solely «moral». Attention must be
paid to prophets solely in relation to this specific end and to this particular
content of the revelation.
Something intended to promote the practice of piety and religion
is called sacred and divine and is sacred only so long as people
use it religiously. If they cease to be pious, the thing in question
likewise, at the same time, ceases to be sacred.30
Once the issue of divine «inspiratio» is set in the emotional terms of
prophetic imagination, the entire exegetical process aims to show the
instrumental sense, the purely human and incidental meaning of the
«sacredness» that can be credited to Scripture. Only «usum» decides
what is sacred:
words deployed in accordance with this usage in such a way
that, on reading them, people are moved to devotion will be
sacred words, and any book written with words so used will
also be sacred.
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When such usage is lost, so much so that «verba» lose their meaning
and the text is completely neglected, «then both words and book will
then likewise have neither use nor sanctity»: nothing more than «ink and
paper».31 The Bible is not «opus Dei» in the sense of a precise and
particular divine «intentio»: an idea that, at a philosophical level, would
push us towards the imaginary figures of God and man created in his
image and likeness, and at the historical and philological level, would not
explain, among other things, the randomness and diversity in the time
frames for composing the text, or the need for four evangelists, or the
incontrovertible fact that the sacredness of the volumes was decided
through many human conflicts, by the authority of equally human councils.32
Scrutinised through the «lumen naturale», and freed from the historical
contingencies of the people of Israel and from the many superstitions and
contradictions it contains –on the jealous and wrathful God of the Old
Testament, on miracles, on the resurrection of Christ–, Scripture is the
«word of God» only because it expresses, in the form of a moral precept,
the «lex divina universalis»: «to love God above all things and one’s
neighbour as oneself».33 This is the only certain and constant teaching of
the Bible, which has remained intact, not consumed by the attrition of
times nor corrupted by the malice of men. The «sacred codes» do not
contain «the deeper points of philosophy that God revealed to them but
only some very simple matters»34, that even the slowest minds can
understand; by only demanding men’s obedience, they condemn
transgression but not ignorance.35 The intellectual knowledge of God
–his sameness with «Natura, sive Substantia»– does not concern «fides».36
The evangelical doctrine imposes that we believe and worship God, that
we obey him; all of its laws consist in «amor», the one commandment of
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the only «catholica religio», the very simple and sole «fundamentum» of
universal faith:
There is a God (that is, a supreme being) who is supremely
just and merciful, or an exemplar of the true life.37
This sort of moral axiom can be articulated into a few more nuclear
«principia» universally understandable and acceptable: that God exists
and is just and merciful; that he is one; that he is present everywhere and
manifest himself in all things; that he holds supreme jus above all things;
that his cult only consists in the love of our neighbour; that those who
follow him will be saved, while those who refuse him will be enslaved by
passions; that he only forgives the sins of those who repent.38 This is all
faith needs, nothing more: not to determine «what God is» and if his
«exemplarity» stems from him being «just and merciful or because from
him and through him and to him are all things»; if he is «everywhere in
essence or in potential»; if he directs everything «from liberty or from the
necessity of nature»; if he orders «edicts like a prince or teaches them as
eternal truths»; if man «obeys God of his own free will or by the necessity
of the divine decree»; if the reward for good men and the penance for
evil men «takes place naturally or supernaturally».39 All of this is answered
openly and directly –and by no means esoterically– by the «ratio», the
one thing designated to know in a true and appropriate way the essence
of God, the productive and expressive nature of God-Nature-Substance,
outlined in the first part of the Ethics. So much so that he who does not
«have faith» but «knows», who is able to know by the natural light of
reason, «is truly happy» even though he ignores the revelation; in fact, he
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38 TTP, XIV (G3, pp. 177-178). As for the influence that Spinoza’s «universal faith»
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of the first).
39 TTP, XIV, p. 183 (G3, pp. 178-179).
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is more blessed than the common people since he «nevertheless has
salutary opinions and a true conception of living».40.
But if this is the case: «cur igitur id credimus?».41 If theology works to
achieve obedience and only philosophy looks at science, what is the
purpose in obeying and believing? The «dogma» of obedience cannot be
directly erected upon «ratio», which is foreign to the logic of obedience;
nevertheless, the reason of the philosopher –of the philosophical writer–
is able to highlight the mo-ral positivity and social convenience of that
dogma:
Everyone without exception can obey, not merely the very
few –very few, that is, in comparison with the whole human
race– who acquire the habit of virtue by the guidance of reason
alone. Hence, if we did not possess this testimony of Scripture,
we would have to consider the salvation of almost all men to
be in doubt.42
Considering the «revelatio» as imagination-passion, there follows both
its irreducibility, at least in part, and its inevitable subordination to adequate
knowledge. Indeed, from here all of Spinoza’s interpretations address
the critical definition (rational reasoning and selection) of an essential and
positive core of «fides», of its fundamental and universal content, different
in its theoretical foundations and purpose from science yet somewhat
similar to it in the effectiveness of its practice. The outcome is the «catholica
religio», that welcomes in the genuine immediacy of obedience moral
principles that are not incompatible with those of reason. «Universal faith»
can become the deistically common base of the most rational and libertarian
cults: within reach of the «philosophical reader». If obedience is a practical
thing that looks at «opera» rather than at opinions,
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the true antichrists are those who persecute honest men and
lovers of justice because they differ from them in doctrine
and do not adhere to the same tenets of belief as themselves.43
Cult followers are not blasphemous because they adapt
the words of the Bible to their own beliefs. Just as it was
once adapted to the understanding of the common people, so
also anyone may adapt it to his own beliefs if he sees that in
this way he can obey God with fuller mental assent in matters
concerning justice and charity;
they have to be condemned because they refuse «to grant the same
liberty to others» and persecute «all who do not think as they do as if
they were enemies of God».44 The articles of universal faith, which are
the beating heart of Scripture, equate, in their extreme extension, all
religious denominations and thus should permit liberty and freedom among
all confessions, the rest being dispensable and secondary. The actual
convergence of «ratio» and «fides», to which the TTP wishes to educate
the «lector philosophus», also has a political purpose, a prerequisite for a
precise political solution. Emancipated classes and more rational
believers, intellectual aristocracy and more tolerant confessions, against
those religious hierarchies and civil institutions that, supported by the
«vulgus», constantly attack freedom.
4.  A democracy without the common people
It follows from all this, first, that either the whole of society (if
this is possible) should hold power together, collegially, so that
all are subject to themselves and nobody must serve their
equal, or else a few men [hold power], or if one man alone
holds power, he will need to have something above ordinary
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human nature – or at least strive with all his resources to
convince the common people that he has.45
Developed on the field of «libertas», the heated opposition between
monarchy and democracy in the TTP stems from theoretical and political
reasons that look at Spinoza’s anthropology of the man-mode (determined
expression of a power, of a «conatus» constitutively related and
determined by the inescapable deity of the Nature-Substance), as well
as, at the same time and under the same conditions, at the political turmoil
taking place in the Netherlands at the time.
Monarchy appears to be the most highly tense solution, since it is
founded on the most rigid and immovable separation of the collective
natural power in the «auctoritas» of the «unius soli» and in the obedience
of all the «others», in the complete submission of the «many». Monarchy
tries to govern this division by adopting, more or less consciously, the
strategy of the theological and dogmatic response, according to which
those who have the power have to be able to make others believe that
«aliquid supra communem humanam naturam».46 Always a formidable
«instrumentum regni», religion gives the «regimen monarchicum» its
«summum arcanum», which is in fact nothing more than slavery passed
off as salvation, in the collective sacrifice for the honour and glory of one
single individual.47 The difference of the «sacra maiestas» against the
equality of the «hominum suffragium», the conviction that the «imperium»
acts in God’s stead (the God-king preached by theologians) and is
preserved and protected «by a singular act of providence and by the
help of God» represent the safest stronghold of the monarchy.48
The obscurity of royal authority is contrasted by the clear
combination of democracy and «libertas»:
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Also, this is the only form of government that I want to discuss
explicitly, since it is the most relevant to my design, my purpose
being to discuss the advantage of liberty in a state.49
Democracy appears as the strongest political solution because it is
the only one wherein the natural, relative and connective character of the
«imperium» can be encompassed and made productive.50 Unlike
monarchy, in the «res publica libera» power is exercised collegially by
everyone, or by the majority of the population. As a matter of fact, not
even democracy can disregard the need for a functional separation
between political and civil power, with the «im-perium» disappearing in a
sort of perfect overlapping, of complete sameness with the «societas».
Rather, democracy manages to assert the maximum circularity of the civil
particular (of any civil particular) and of the political universal: indeed, in
the democratic government,
no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way
that they are not thereafter consulted but rather to the majority
of the whole society of which they are a part.51
When all the forces that stir within the society access the political scene,
what is flagrantly highlighted is the «arcanum imperii», that is the reciprocal
nature of power relationships even in monarchy. But how is collective power
achieved? How it is possible to build democracy despite and against the
«vulgus» that are impulsive and fickle, passionate and ignorant?
In the TTP there are two emblematic «species» of democracy. In the
ancient world, not Athens but Jerusalem, it is the result of the most powerful
imagination of the most powerful among all prophets, that builds among
the Jews a sort of democratic theocracy, the only possible solution for
a rude and primitive people, just freed from slavery. Its essential ingredients
are: equality in the absolute submission to God’s commands; equal right
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to consult God, and to receive and interpret his laws; participation of all
tribes in the management of the State: an equal taking part, dividing the
«imperium», the control and management of power into parts (it is not a
representative State); the army of citizens, driven by a common sense
that reduces war to a limited and incidental means to achieve peace; the
foundation of the love of country, constantly solidified by usefulness,
«driving force behind all human actions»: full right of ownership, equal
distribution of lands and fields, and the periodic restoration of its original
conditions, on occasion of the Jubilee.52 The political theology of Moses
feeds the feeling of «pietas» that encompasses every public function and
every private duty, pervaded by the fear of God: the only way to ensure
equal submission to the laws and equal political participation, connecting
to the «ratio» of collective interest the passion of unthinking, impulsive,
and undisciplined common people, under the strict direction of God (of
his imaginative Prophet).
In the modern age, democracy is presented in the TTP as the outcome
of a rational agreement, of a contract between reasonable parties. The
problematic character of this statement has often been highlighted, given
Spinoza’s theoretical premises that regard the «imperium» as a natural
expression of men’s «conatus»: an absolutely natural determination, alien
to the radical rationale of Hobbes’s «pactum» (and to the idea of the
social contract itself, reduced by Spinoza to the unstable and occasional
logic of mere usefulness).53 Upon closer inspection, however, the «pactum»
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of the TTP institutes democracy, but it is not arguably established
(executed, ratified) by all the beneficiaries of democracy. The democratic
contract has an aristocratic origin. The agreement that puts democracy in
place seems to involve rational people, but not the «vulgus», appearing
as a rational gesture that imposes itself upon irrational people. The
formulations that accompany it, seem to go in this direction, in the clear
uncertainty between free compliance and forced intervention: «cedant,
vel cedere cogantur»; «vel vi vel sponte».54 Not necessarily inconsistent
with the theoretical premises, (once it is regarded as a minor and limited
part of the «res publica libera»), the contract appears to be the last point,
the final outcome of the reconversion in libertarian and rationalising terms
of theology and politics, which is the focus of the entire essay. In opposition
and as an alternative to authoritarianism, which sees the supports of
monarchy and official cults endeavouring to promote an absolutist
standardization of the Dutch experience, Spinoza is convinced that in the
Netherlands there is an articulation and development of forces, a
deployment of reasons and feelings, of ideas and interest, so much so
that tempering and refraining passions and prejudices under the control
and dictate of reason, is practical and feasible. Starting from an adequate
theological and political education, which is an alternative to the hierarchical
and authoritarian one, the conditions of the Country would essentially
allow for an agreement, an alliance of the most energetic and newest part
of Dutch society in the name of the safeguard and enhancement of
democracy, freedom and tolerance. Rather than a real theoretical
architrave, a logical principle able to support and explain the essence of
the «imperium», the idea of the contract seems to take a determined
(defined, temporary) value of a metaphor-project, of a political and cultural
code word, in view of a great pedagogical and political understanding
between aristocracy, the bearer of an emancipated «ratio», and the less
dogmatic and most reasonable confessions, which by their own nature
can be better converted, in the political practice, to republican rationality,
the most suitable for an evolved and developed society, by now able to
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demystify old power relations and ready to replace them with other new
and «universal» powers. Hence, not only does the contract not give the
«vulgus», easily manipulated by theologians and monarchists, a leading
role but excludes them beforehand, in the implicit and moderate belief
that it can possibly reform them in a functioning republican regime,
cultivating as much as possible their intellect and interest in the new power
structures and collective logic of the State. However, at a pivotal stage in
its founding process, the equality of democracy splits in a vertical way,
that is excluding the majority of the many: the «plerique» that should enliven
any «imperium democraticum» and instead, at least during the challenges
and conflicts of its establishment, remains the fuel of traditional cults and
of the promoters of monarchy-tyranny.
Ultimately, the contract between rational people is the design of a
defined élite, a political project conceptually presented yet actually
destined to the minority and doomed to fail. The lynching of Jan De Witt
(leading representative of the republican faction along with his brother
Cornelius), marks the demise of a design aimed at the political
rationality of theolo-gy. The most tenacious, the most worried of being
involved in the scandal of the TTP, will be precisely the representatives
of libertarian cults, afraid of repercussions and repression. It will be
necessary to consider more thoroughly, both on a theoretical and historical
viewpoint, the «vulgus» that engulfed the party of rational people. It will
be necessary to make this change towards realism that recognizes the
irresistible abundance of reality as compared to the ambitions of culture
(and of political pedagogy): nothing more than a card among the others,
played in the great game of power and history. It will be necessary to
fully deal with the «saeva multitudo».
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